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A GENDER-BASED APPROACH TO
HISTORICAL CHILD SUPPORT:
COMMENT ON COLUCCI V COLUCCI
Jodi Lazare* & Kelsey Warr* **
In June 2021 the Supreme Court of Canada (the “Court”)
released Colucci v Colucci, its second decision in twelve
months dealing with the complex subject of historical
(commonly referred to as retroactive) child support. The
case worked a significant shift in the law, arguably the first
major revision to the law since the Court’s initial
consideration of historical child support in DBS, in 2006.
This comment suggests that Colucci represents a new
understanding of the way that claims for historical child
support should be considered in Canadian family law. The
comment argues that in changing the applicable
framework, the Court has endorsed a gendered approach
to historical child support law that responds to many of the
concerns that flowed from DBS. Drawing on the text of the
decision, as well as relevant case law and scholarship, we
outline the theoretical foundations for the changes brought
by Colucci, as well as their practical implications. We
suggest that in clarifying child support as the right of the
child, decreasing the emphasis on certainty for payors, and
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stressing the necessity of financial disclosure, the Court
has feminized the law of historical child support. We
explain how, using that feminist lens, Colucci modifies the
framework for adjudicating historical child support
claims, by creating a presumption in favour of an award in
the presence of a change of income, softening the threeyear time limit of so-called retroactivity, and repositioning
and reconceptualizing the DBS factors which now inform
how far back a historical child support award should go.
In fleshing out and analyzing these changes, we consider
the ways in which Colucci may better serve to promote
substantive gender equality in historical child support law
by responding to women and children’s lived realities.
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INTRODUCTION
It has been more than a decade since the Supreme Court of
Canada [“the Court”] first addressed the issue of
retroactive, or historical, child support.1 Nevertheless,
historical child support has remained an unsettled issue in
Canada, despite the Court’s guiding decision on the matter
in DBS, 16 years ago.2 Indeed, DBS has been one of the
most judicially considered family law cases in
existence,3 which is not surprising considering the
enormous amounts of unpaid child support in this country
and the impacts of non-payment, on women and children
in particular.4 In short, a clear and consistent approach to

1

It should be noted from the outset that although courts refer to past
child support obligations as “retroactive,” the Supreme Court
explained, in DBS v SRG, 2006 SCC 37, [2006] 2 SCR 231 [DBS], that
that terminology is not quite accurate, given that the claims in question
simply ask a court to enforce obligations that existed at the relevant
(historical) time. See also Lucinda Ferguson, “Retroactivity, Social
Obligation and Child Support” (2006) 43 Alta L Rev 1049 at 10491050. Accordingly, for the sake of accuracy, we use the term “historical
child support” throughout this comment. While the Supreme Court
eventually changed course, using the language of historical support in
Michel v Graydon, 2020 SCC 24 [Michel] to refer to support owed to
now-adult children, we believe it is the better term for any support
owed in the past, but not paid when due.

2

DBS, supra note 1.

3

Five and a half years following the decision, it had been judicially
considered 932 times. See Marie L. Gordon, “An Update on
Retroactive Child and Spousal Support: Five Years after S.(D.B.) V.
G.(S.R.)” (2012) 31:1 Can Fam LQ 71 at 71.

4

See House of Commons Debates, 42-1, Vol 148, No 326 (26 September
2018) at 21867 (Hon Jody Wilson-Raybould).
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claims for historical child support has been difficult to
come by… until now.
In DBS, the Court confirmed a claimant’s ability to
ask for child support owed in the past but never agreed to,
ordered, or paid. In other words, the law of historical child
support recognizes that the absence of an agreement or
order to pay child support commensurate with the noncustodial parent’s income does not absolve the payor of
their obligation to pay. Child support, then, is a standalone
obligation, irrespective of the terms of a separation
agreement, or an order granting a divorce, or any other
agreement between a child’s parents.5 In consequence, and
as confirmed in DBS in 2006, a court may order
unacknowledged and unpaid support years after the
obligation was first due.
More recently, in 2019 and 2020, the Court heard
two separate appeals addressing different aspects of
historical child support. In brief, Michel v Graydon dealt
with questions around the statement in DBS that historical
support could not be ordered once a beneficiary of child
support is no longer a “child of the marriage,” i.e., a minor
or otherwise dependent child.6 Colucci v Colucci, the
subject of this comment, addressed issues related to the
5

See DBS, supra note 1 (“This parental obligation [to support their
children in a way that is commensurate with their income], like the
children’s concomitant right to support, exists independently of any
statute or court order” at para 54).

6

Michel, supra note 1. The phrase “child of the marriage,” referring to
a dependent child eligible for child support, comes from the Divorce
Act, RSC 1985, c 3 (2nd Supp), s 15.1(1) [Divorce Act] and the Federal
Child Support Guidelines SOR/97-175, s 2(1) [Child Support
Guidelines].
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applicability of the reasoning in DBS to cases involving
claims for a retroactive reduction of support or the
reduction or recission of unpaid child support arrears.7
Both decisions examined—and, to differing degrees,
modified—the factors first set out in DBS that judges
should weigh in adjudicating a contested claim for
historical child support. While both decisions make
important contributions to the law of historical child
support, this comment relates primarily to the more recent
decision in Colucci, which engaged in a deeper analysis
and modification of the substantive legal principles and
formal mechanisms first set out in DBS.8
As the case law and literature on historical child
support make clear, there is no universal consensus or
overarching theory of child support.9 However, this
comment suggests that the subtle but significant changes
made by the Court in Colucci to the DBS framework
illustrate the judicial endorsement of a feminist theory of
child support as a means of pursuing substantive gender
equality—an approach that is responsive to the
documented gender disparities that typically result from
7

Colucci v Colucci, 2021 SCC 24 [Colucci].

8

The majority reasons in Michel, for their part, were limited to
answering the technical question of whether support can be varied
historically once the beneficiary has reached the age of majority. See
Aaron Franks & Michael Zalev, “Franks & Zalev’s This Week in
Family Law”, Family Law Newsletter (7 June 2021), online: <
https://nextcanada.westlaw.com/Document/Ide44dea68f1e47f8e0540
010e03eefe0/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextD
ata=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=cblt1.0>.

9

See Scott Altman, “A Theory of Child Support” (2003) 17:2 Int’l JL
Pol’y & Fam 173 at 174.
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family breakdown.10 Of course, feminism is a loaded term,
with many meanings.11 This comment uses the term to
mean a feminist, or women’s perspective, that recognizes
the gendered dimensions of family law and strives for
genuine gender equality, in family law and beyond.
Moreover, the feminist approach employed here is
grounded in the pursuit of substantive gender equality and
the recognition that differently situated groups—here,
women and mothers—might merit different treatment in
order to obtain similar outcomes.12 Indeed, to promote this
understanding, courts must be “concerned with ensuring
that laws or policies do not impose subordinating treatment
on groups already suffering social, political, or economic
disadvantage in Canadian society.”13 Thus, Colucci
10

Women with sole custody of their children are almost twice as likely
to live below the poverty line compared to fathers with sole custody,
42% versus 25.5%. See Statistics Canada, Census in Brief: Children
living in low-income households, Catalogue No 98-200-X2016012
(Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 13 September 2017), online:
<www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2016/as-sa/98-200x/2016012/98-200-x2016012-eng.cfm> [Children in Low-Income
Households]. This likely flows from the fact that women still tend to
work less hours, are over-represented in part-time work, and are paid
less on average compared to men. See Statistics Canada, Women and
Paid Work, by Melissa Moyser, in Women in Canada: A Gender-based
Statistical Report, 7th ed, Catalogue No 89-503-X (Ottawa: Statistics
Canada,
8
March
2017)
online
(pdf):
<www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/en/pub/89-503-x/2015001/article/14694eng.pdf?st=1O4F3l9Z>.

11

See Katharine T Bartlett, “Feminist Legal Methods” (1990) 103:4 Harv
L Rev 829.

12

See Claire L'Heureux-Dube, "Making Equality Work in Family Law"
(1997) 14:2 Can J Fam L 103.

13

Colucci v Colucci, 2021 SCC 24 (Factum of the Intervenor, West Coast
Legal Education and Action Fund Association And The Women’s
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functions to recognize and respond to the gendered context
of historical child support.
This is not the first time the Court has endorsed an
equality-based approach to gendered family law issues; it
has been nearly three decades since the Court expressly
recognized the importance of such a response to a gendered
phenomenon when it instructed trial judges to take judicial
notice of the feminization of poverty that results from
unequal childcare burdens in the context of both spousal
support and child support.14 Despite those advances, the
same reasoning was not extended to historical child
support—a fact that led to criticism in the past.15
This comment proceeds as follows: First, we
outline the law of historical child support, in theory and in
terms of judge-made rules, prior to Colucci. Here, we look
at the rationale for the introduction of the Child Support
Guidelines in 1997,16 and provide an overview of the
framework set out in DBS and later clarified in Michel. We
then turn to a close read of Colucci, starting with a brief
Legal Education And Action Fund Inc at para 12 [LEAF Colucci
Factum]), citing Jonnette Watson Hamilton & Jennifer Koshan,
“Adverse Impact: The Supreme Court’s Approach to Adverse Effects
Discrimination under Section 15 of the Charter” (2015) 19:2 Rev Const
Stud 191 at 194-195.
14

See Moge v Moge, [1992] 3 SCR 813, 99 DLR (4th) 456 [Moge];
Willick v Willick, [1994] 3 SCR 670, 119 DLR (4th) 405.

15

Note that both DBS and Michel contained minority judgements
addressing some of these questions. For a feminist critique of DBS see
e.g. Gordon, supra note 3; Ferguson, supra note 1; Natasha Bakht et
al, "D.B.S. v. S.G.R.: Promoting Women's Equality through the
Automatic Recalculation of Child Support" (2006) 18:2 CJWL 535.

16

Child Support Guidelines, supra note 6.
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history of the case, followed by an analysis of the Court’s
gendered approach to modifying the DBS framework. This
approach includes an emphasis on child support as the right
of the child, a decreased importance placed on certainty for
payor parents, and, significantly, an acknowledgment of
the necessity of income disclosure on the part of payors.
Flowing from this approach, the specific changes include a
new presumption in favour of an award of historical
support, the erosion of the controversial “three-year
rule”,17 and a repositioning of the DBS factors. Last, we
discuss how Colucci fits within the broader context of
Canadian family law and whether it adequately responds to
the issues that plagued family law following the release of
DBS.
1. HISTORICAL CHILD SUPPORT BEFORE
COLUCCI
Historical child support has long been a significant issue in
family law. Based on the amount of litigation and
discussion around the topic,18 it is not surprising that the
Court saw fit to revisit the subject. In this part, we outline
the history of the law of historical child support, and the
legislative and judicial background that led to the Court’s
decision in Colucci. We begin with a brief discussion of the
Child Support Guidelines, and then outline the reasoning
in both DBS and Michel.

17

See discussion of the “three-year rule” infra note 32.

18

As seen above, DBS was judicially considered almost 1,000 times in
the first five years after the decision and has been the subject of much
scholarship. See Gordon, supra note 3; Ferguson, supra note 1; Bakht
et al, supra note 15.
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1.1 STREAMLINING CHILD SUPPORT THROUGH
THE FEDERAL CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES
It is impossible to meaningfully discuss any element of
child support law in Canada without reference to the Child
Support Guidelines.19 The Child Support Guidelines came
into force in 1997 and drastically altered the landscape of
child support throughout the country. Prior to their
adoption, child support was determined on the basis of
need and ability to pay, taking into account the income of
both parents as well as the estimated costs of raising the
child.20 Significantly, the pre-Child Support Guidelines
approach endowed trial judges with nearly unfettered
discretion in making a child support award, guided almost
exclusively by the amorphous principle of the best interests
of the child.21 Although the Child Support Guidelines
maintained some of that discretion in the rules governing
special expenses and support in cases of shared parenting,
19

Child Support Guidelines, supra note 6.

20

See Paras v Paras (1970), [1971] 1 OR 130, 14 DLR (3d) 546 [Paras],
an early Court of Appeal decision addressing the child support
provisions of the Divorce Act, RSC 1967-68 (Can.), c. 24 and set out
the basic, fundamental principles of child support law that remained in
place until the creation of the Child Support Guidelines.

21

The discretionary approach has been criticized for creating child
support awards which were too low, inconsistent, and unpredictable.
See Courtney Palmer, “Child Support and Shared Parenting in Canada:
A ‘Reality Cheque’” (2013) 22 Dal J Leg Stud 101 at 102, citing
Children Come First: A Report to Parliament on the Provisions and
Operation of the Federal Child Support Guidelines, Volume 1 (2002)
at 1, online (pdf): Department of Justice Canada
<https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/fl-lf/child-enfant/rp/pdf/v1.pdf>
at 1 [Children Come First]; Nicholas Bala, “Judicial Discretion and
Family Law Reform in Canada” (1986) 5:1 Can J Fam L 15 at 22–23.

218

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 34, 2022]

for example,22 the primary determination of child support
became instead a straightforward number based on the
payor parent’s income and the number of children.23
The Child Support Guidelines apply only to
married spouses under the federal Divorce Act,24 but all of
the provinces have adopted similar rules to govern child
support obligations outside the context of a divorce.25 The
effect of the Child Support Guidelines has been increased
certainty in support amounts as well as a larger push
towards out-of-court settlement, as both parties have a
clearer understanding of their financial obligations.26
However, where historical child support was concerned,
the transition to the Child Support Guidelines presented
difficulties, as judges continued to exercise broad

22

See Child Support Guidelines, supra note 6, ss 7, 9.

23

Quebec is the exception to this. In that province, child support awards
take into account the income of both payor and recipient parents. See
Regulation respecting the determination of child support payments,
CQLR c C-25.01, r 0.4; Droit de la famille — 139, 2013 QCCA 15.

24

The Guidelines having been established by the Governor General
pursuant to the Divorce Act, supra note 6, s 26.1.

25

See e.g. Family Law Act Regulation, BC Reg 347/2012, s 8; Provincial
Child Support Guidelines, NS Reg 83/2017, s 2(1).

26

As per their objective. See Child Support Guidelines, supra note 6, s
1(b)–(d). Scholars have found the Guidelines for the most part to be
“remarkably successful.” See Rollie Thompson, “Rules and
Rulelessness in Family Law: Recent Developments, Judicial and
Legislative” (2000) 18 Can Fam LQ 25 at 28 [Thompson, “Rules and
Rulelessness”]. Further, discussions with legal professionals have
shown an increase in settlements following the implementation of the
Child Support Guidelines. See Children Come First, supra note 21 at
11.
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discretion in adjudicating these kind of claims.27 It was
against that background that the Court decided DBS and
created a framework for the awarding of historical child
support.
1.2 STRUCTURING HISTORICAL SUPPORT: DBS
V SRG
DBS involved four separate appeals from the Court of
Appeal of Alberta, all dealing with claims by primary
parents (mothers, in all four cases) for historical child
support.28 The Court set out to determine whether a court
can order historical child support and, if so, the
circumstances in which such orders are appropriate. On the
first question, the Court found that orders for historical
child support were statutorily available and should not be
considered exceptional. Indeed, historical support orders
only seek to enforce the payment of support already owed
at the time in question.29 With regard to eligibility for an
award, the Court determined that to receive an order for
historical support, the child in question must still be a child
27

See Christine Davies, “Retroactive Child Support: the Alberta Trilogy”
(2005) 24 Can Fam LQ 1 at 9–10, observing that while the Alberta
Court of Appeal had embodied a “broad and generous” approach to
retroactive support, other provinces had not followed suit. For
example, Ontario had generally found that retroactive support should
be ordered sparingly and that courts did not have jurisdiction to order
retroactive support based on non-disclosed income changes. See
Marinangeli v Marinangeli, [2003] CarswellOnt 2691, 228 DLR (4th)
376 (ONCA); Walsh v Walsh, [2004] CarswellOnt 356, 69 OR (3d)
577 (ONCA).

28

Hiemstra v Hiemstra, 2005 ABCA 16; DBS v SRG, 2005 ABCA 2;
LJW v TAR, 2005 ABCA 3; Henry v Henry, 2005 ABCA 5.

29

See DBS, supra note 1 at para 97.
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of the marriage,30 or the equivalent under the applicable
provincial legislation.31
The Court went on to outline four factors that
should inform the determination of whether a court should
order historical support: the presence of a reasonable
excuse on the part of the recipient parent for not seeking
support earlier; any blameworthy conduct by the payor
parent; the circumstances of the child; and the hardship
occasioned by a historical award. If these factors indicate
that an award is appropriate, support should generally only
be ordered retroactive to the date of effective notice—that
is, the date that the claimant expressed her intention to
claim historical support—or up to three years prior to the
date of effective notice.32 A judge might depart from this
general rule, however, and award historical support for
more than three years preceding the claim, where a payor

30

See Divorce Act, supra note 6, s 2(1).

31

See DBS, supra note 1 at paras 86–90. As the case involved
relationships covered by both the Divorce Act, supra note 6 and the
Parentage and Maintenance Act, RSA 2000, c P-1 (repealed and
replaced by Family Law Act, SA 2003, c F-4.5), both were considered
when discussing support eligibility.

32

See DBS, supra note 1 at paras 120–123. This has become known as
the “three-year rule.” In concrete terms, the rule means that in the
absence of “blameworthy conduct”—a narrow category following
DBS—a father who owes 12 years of support would only be required
to pay a maximum of three years’ worth of support. Predictably, the
rule created an avenue for payors to escape their obligations simply by
waiting out the clock. Note that Justice Abella firmly dissented on this
point, reasoning that since children are entitled to support, the date of
retroactivity should be the date on which the payor’s income increased.
See DBS, supra note 1 at paras 162–164.
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is found to have engaged in blameworthy conduct that put
their interests above that of the beneficiary child.33
1.2.1 Critiques of DBS
While the Court’s detailed examination and treatment of
historical child support went a long way in clarifying what
had been a particularly confusing area of family law,
several aspects of the decision were the target of significant
critique. Most of the criticism seemed to flow from the fact
that instead of embracing the existence of the Child
Support Guidelines, DBS seemed to represent a
compromise between the pre- and post-Child Support
Guidelines eras.34 Specifically, the DBS Court seemed
particularly focussed on the goal of certainty for payors—
a relic from earlier times and a stark departure from the
reasoning, in the DBS appeals, of the Court of Appeal of
Alberta, which had set out a much more child-centered
approach, emphasizing the need to fully embrace the Child
Support Guidelines and move away from the significant
judicial discretion that had previously characterized the
law.35 Indeed, it is difficult to read DBS without being
struck by the Court’s intense preoccupation with the right
of payors to be certain of their obligations, often seemingly
33

Ibid at para 124.

34

See e.g. Henderson v Micetich, 2021 ABCA 103 at para 31
[Henderson]; Colucci, supra note 7 at para 44; Bakht et al, supra note
15 at 561–562.

35

See DBS v SRG, 2005 ABCA 2 at para 153 for an overview of the Court
of Appeal’s framework. Further, following the case (and before the
SCC released its decision) scholarship observed the positive impacts
on children’s lives that resulted from the ABCA’s approach. See
Davies, supra note 27.
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above all else—logic that is hard to justify when the Child
Support Guidelines are clear that support obligations are
directly connected to payor income and will fluctuate
accordingly.36
That focus on payor certainty gave rise to a number
of critiques and issues in application. First, as a result of
some of the more confusing and restrictive aspects of the
DBS framework, trial judges were required to find creative
workarounds to avoid unjust results. Moreover, the
apparent privileging of payor interests provoked intense
responses anchored in feminist legal theory and the
connection between women’s poverty and the issue of
historical child support.
Turning first to the creative navigation around the
limits of DBS, several aspects of the DBS framework
required trial judges to create a workaround in order to
come to what they deemed a fair result. One regular
example was the statement, in DBS, that historical awards
can only be granted while the beneficiary remains a child
of the marriage, or dependent. While many cases adhered
directly to the Court’s requirement that a child be eligible
for support at the time of the application,37 another line of
cases relied on section 17, the variation provision of the
36

This is especially true given that when DBS was decided by the
Supreme Court, the Child Support Guidelines had been in force for
nine years (six years at the initial trial levels) and that the parties (DBS
and SRG) had separated after the adoption of the Child Support
Guidelines (although the other three couples had separated/divorced
earlier).

37

See e.g. Roose v Roose, 2010 NSSC 180; Warwoda v Warwoda, 2009
ABQB 582 at paras 17–24; de Rooy v Bergstrom, 2010 BCCA 5 at
paras 63–66. See also Gordon, supra note 3 at 81.
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Divorce Act,38 to circumvent this rule and award historical
child support in cases where it may have otherwise been
barred because the child in question was no longer a
dependent.39
This was just one of the many issues encountered
by trial judges applying the DBS framework. Others
included misunderstandings around what constitutes
blameworthy conduct,40 as well as the broader issue of
retroactive decreases and whether the reasoning in DBS
should apply to these kind of claims.41 The details of many
of those issues are beyond the scope of this comment, but
others have discussed them to suggest that the DBS
38

Divorce Act, supra note 6, s 17.

39

See e.g. Buckingham v Buckingham, 2013 ABQB 155; Charron v
Dumais, 2016 ONSC 7491; Catena v Catena, 2015 ONSC 3186.
Importantly, this was the main issue addressed in Colucci v Colucci,
2017 ONCA 892 [Colucci Appeal 1] (the first dispute between the
same parties to go to the Ontario Court of Appeal) as well as Michel,
supra note 1.

40

Although the Court, in DBS, supra note 1 at para 106, stated that
blameworthy conduct was “anything that privileges the payor parent's
own interests over his/her children's right to an appropriate amount of
support,” this has not been fully accepted by courts. See Gordon, supra
note 3 at 74. Specifically, there has been disagreement around whether
non-disclosure of income constitute blameworthy conduct. For cases
that it does not, see e.g. Tochor v Kerr, 2011 SKQB 42; Peterson v
Peterson, 2011 SKQB 365; Patton-Casse v Casse, 2011 ONSC 4424.
For cases saying that non-disclosure does constitute blameworthy
conduct, see e.g. Hartshorne v Hartshorne, 2009 BCSC 698; Carlaw
v Carlaw, 2009 NSSC 428; ERH v BWH, 2009 BCCA 573.

41

This was the key issue in Colucci, supra note 7, with Gray v Rizzi, 2016
ONCA 152 [Gray] being relied on to support the idea that the DBS
factors do apply to claims for “retroactive” decreases, and PMB v MLB,
2010 NBCA 5 being relied on for the opposite approach.
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framework was not the solution to the issue of historical
child support that family law stakeholders might have
hoped for.42
Turning now to the feminist critique, concerns
about the connections between historical child support and
women’s poverty were being expressed even before the
Court decided DBS.43 That critique resulted in large part
from the fact that the Women’s Legal Education and
Action Fund (“LEAF”) was not able to intervene in the
hearing at the Court.44 Instead of appearing in Court, LEAF
published its arguments, as well as a post-script critique of
the decision, outlining the various issues around the
feminization of poverty and the systemic inequality faced
by women who care for children post-separation—issues
that were simply not considered by the Court.45 To be clear,
the concept of the feminization of poverty and its
connection with family breakdown and child-rearing was
not foreign to the Court; it had previously—and
explicitly—addressed similar issues 13 years earlier in
42

This disappointment was aptly expressed by the Alberta Court of
Appeal in Henderson, supra note 34 at para 29, referring to Michel,
supra note 1 as aligning “more comfortably with the purpose and intent
of the Guidelines when conceived and enacted.” See also Bakht et al,
supra note 15 for a negative reaction to the SCC’s decision in DBS
compared to the reasoning of Alberta Court of Appeal.

43

See e.g. Bakht et al, supra note 15 (published subsequent, but written
prior to the Supreme Court’s decision).

44

A procedural change at the Supreme Court of Canada meant that no
interveners were able to appear, including the Defence for Children
International-Canada and the Canadian Foundation for Children,
Youth and the Law. See Bakht et al, supra note 15.

45

See ibid.
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Moge, interpreting the spousal support provisions of the
Divorce Act.46 Nevertheless, those fundamental
considerations were simply absent from the majority
reasoning in DBS. By ignoring the social context of child
support, DBS thus failed to account for some significant
issues bound up with claims for historical child support
awards, especially those related to family violence and
gender inequality.47
The clearest and perhaps most glaring omission in
DBS was the Court’s failure to explicitly require payor
parents to disclose their income on a regular basis, thus
placing the burden of inquiring into income changes on the
recipient parent. While the majority seemed to recognize
the informational inequality that exists between parties,48
an automatic or regular disclosure requirement was
characterized as an unnecessary burden on payor parents.49
This is an interesting, and problematic, position to take
based on the documented negative impact that nondisclosure has upon recipient parents, most of whom are
women.50 The reality of the application-based system
outlined by the Court is that unless recipient parents know
payors’ incomes, they cannot request appropriate amounts
46

See Moge, supra note 14.

47

See Bakht et al, supra note 15 at 561–562.

48

See DBS, supra note 1 at para 124.

49

See ibid at para 58.

50

Based on cases enrolled in maintenance enforcement programs, 96%
involved a father paying support. See Mary Bess Kelly, “Payment
patterns of child and spousal support” (24 April 2013) at 5, online
(pdf): Statistics Canada <www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/en/pub/85-002x/2013001/article/11780-eng.pdf?st=VL0k5OPP>.
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of support.51 As a result of the informational inequality
caused by this structure, women often lack the ability to
access the support their children are entitled to, requiring
them to make up for this gap as best that they can.52 By
overlooking this reality, and placing the burden on
recipient mothers, DBS effectively ignored the gendered
dimensions of historical child support and its uneven
impacts on women, further exacerbating the feminization
of poverty.53
Through its efforts to not unnecessarily burden
payors, the Court inadvertently enabled them to use their
informational advantage to avoid their support obligations
without consequence. That reasoning created a gap that
needed to be filled by judges and lawyers’ incorporation of
specific language around disclosure obligations in support
orders and agreements, respectively.54 In consequence,
legislatures intervened, with several provinces creating
programs or legislation requiring annual disclosure by
payor parents.55 However, these programs vary greatly;
while some provinces maintain robust mandatory
recalculation programs, where income is deemed to have

51

See DBS, supra note 1 at para 56.

52

See Bakht et al, supra note 15 (“When payors fail to pay or underpay
support, women are impoverished. Since financial resources are linked
to social and political power, women’s disentitlement to guideline
child support under the restrictive approach denies them substantive
equality” at 557).

53

See ibid.

54

See ibid at 563.

55

See Gordon, supra note 3 at 91–94.
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increased in the absence of disclosure,56 others instead
employ optional, fee-based, recalculation services,57 where
parties must opt-in and pay for administrative disclosure
requirements and any resulting recalculation. The
inconsistency in these programs drives home the idea that
DBS represented a missed opportunity for the Court to
recognise the necessity of disclosure and to promote
substantive gender equality by reducing the frequency of
non-disclosure by payors and mitigating its
disproportionate impacts on Canadian women and
children.
1.3 ANSWERING LINGERING QUESTIONS:
MICHEL V GRAYDON
Almost 15 years and much spilled ink later, the Court
revisited the question of historical child support and the
complex impacts of DBS. In late 2019, the Court heard
Michel v Graydon, an appeal involving a simple (and all
too common) set of facts where a father underpaid support
for years based on misrepresented income. The central
question in Michel was whether the DBS rule that a
beneficiary of child support must still be a “child of the
56

These provinces include Newfoundland & Labrador and Prince
Edward Island. See Government of Newfoundland and Labrador,
“Child Support Recalculation Program”, online (pdf): Government of
Newfoundland and Labrador <www.gov.nl.ca/jps/files/childsupportrecalculation-information-pamphlet.pdf>;
Administrative
Recalculation of Child Support Regulations, PEI Reg EC465/03.

57

These provinces include Alberta and Quebec. See Child Support
Recalculation Program Regulation, Alta Reg 287/2009; “SARPA”,
online:
Commission
des
Services
Juridiques
<www.csj.qc.ca/commission-des-services-juridiques/autresservices/Sarpa/en>.
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marriage” at the time of an application for historical child
support applied to requests for variations under section 17
of the Divorce Act (as opposed to initial orders under
section 15). As mentioned above, this was one issue that
led to judicial workarounds and creative reasoning in the
wake of DBS. In Michel, the Court brought some muchneeded clarity to the question.
Michel was not a unanimous decision, although the
whole Court agreed on the result: the beneficiary of a claim
for historical variation of child support need not be a
dependent child at the time of the application. Justice
Brown wrote for a five-judge majority, dealing with the
technical issues of eligibility for support and jurisdiction to
order historical variation. In a much longer concurring
judgement, Justice Martin, writing for two, examined the
same issues, but with a much heavier focus on policy
considerations.58 Justice Martin also suggested the DBS
framework was ripe for further revision in the right case. It
is too early to properly evaluate the impact of Michel, but
it is nevertheless noteworthy that both scholars59 and trial
judges60 have seemingly chosen to treat both sets of
58

There were also a third set of reasons delivered Justices Abella and
Karakatsanis, which consist of a single sentence agreeing with both
Justice Brown’s “excellent reasons” and Justice Martin’s “important
policy considerations”. See Michel, supra note 1 at para 136.

59

See Rollie Thompson, “The Supreme Court Begins to Rewrite DBS in
Michel v Graydon” (2020) 39:3 Can Fam LQ 309 [Thompson,
“Rewrite”]. In his summary of the decision, Thompson did little to
separate the two sets of reasons and emphasised the ways in which
Martin J’s policy reasons built upon Brown J’s framework.

60

See e.g. KH v AH, 2020 NLSC 143 [KH]; Cavanagh v Wagner, 2020
ONSC 7444 [Cavanagh]; CC v RT, 2021 PESC 2 [CC]; and MML v
JKS, 2021 BCPC 18 [MML]. Further the only reported appellate case
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reasons as a comprehensive decision—a perspective that
the Court seems to have later embraced completely in
Colucci.
While Michel is not the subject of this comment, it
is worth briefly reviewing, as the reasoning there formed
the groundwork for Colucci. As explained by Rollie
Thompson, the case can be boiled down to four key
findings: a child’s dependency is not relevant when
addressing claims for variation of child support; the bar of
a child being “of the marriage” in originating claims should
be re-evaluated; blameworthy conduct should be read
expansively and includes a duty of disclosure; and a
recipient parent’s reasons for delay can include issues
related to access to justice.61 Further, the three-year rule is
now a less certain requirement, with Justice Martin
referring to it as a “soft limit or rough guideline,”62 rather
than the stricter rule articulated in DBS.
Compared to DBS, Michel employed a much more
child-centred view of historical child support and
considered deeper policy issues around access to justice
and gender inequality that were absent in DBS.63 Thus,
Michel represents the genesis of a gendered approach to
historical child support law, a perspective that the Court
then expanded and solidified nine months later in Colucci.
to discuss Michel also avoided making any real distinction between the
two sets of reasons. See Henderson, supra note 34.
61

See Thompson, “Rewrite”, supra note 59 at 309.

62

Michel, supra note 1 at para 127.

63

This might be attributable in some part to the fact a chapter of LEAF
was able to intervene in the hearing of Michel.
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2. COLUCCI: AN EQUALITY-BASED APPROACH
If DBS worked to set out the law of historical child support
and Michel worked to modify and clarify that law, Colucci
might be read as restructuring the understanding of not
only historical support, but also the theoretical basis for
child support in Canada more generally. As we suggest in
this part, Colucci saw the Court explicitly endorse an
approach to child support generally, and to the analysis
triggered by claims for historical child support, anchored
in the pursuit of substantive gender equality—one that
accounts for and responds to the different experiences of
men and women following family breakdown.64 For
example, Colucci recognizes and responds to the fact that
women are much more likely to be primary parents and to
have to adjust their lives accordingly.65 As a result, the
majority of custodial mothers experience reduced income
and standards of living following family breakdown,
whereas men tend to fare better following a divorce.66 Nonpayment of child support only exacerbates these
documented disparities. In this part, we first set out the
background to the case. We then unpack the Court’s
gender-based analysis and explain how the law may now
function to remedy the situation of mothers as primary
parents by creating a presumption in favour of an award
64

See Moge, supra note 14.

65

See ibid, citing Brockie v Brockie (1987), 5 RFL (3d) 440 (Man QB)
(“To be a custodial parent involves adoption of a lifestyle which, in
ensuring the welfare and development of the child, places many
limitations and burdens upon that parent” at 868).

66

See Dr Anne-Marie Ambert, Divorce: Facts, Causes and
Consequences, 3rd ed (Ottawa: The Vanier Institute of the Family,
2005) at 15.
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and, given the emphasis on disclosure, alleviating some of
the burden on claimants of historical child support.
2.1 BACKGROUND
The background leading up to Colucci is both a complex
and simple set of facts. On one hand, the case was drawn
out over several years and involved two trips to the Court
of Appeal for Ontario before reaching the Supreme Court.
On the other hand, the factual background of a payor father
doing everything in his power to avoid paying child
support is all too common.
The parties were married in 1983 and divorced in
1996. They had two daughters (aged 6 and 8 at the time
of the divorce) and as a part of the divorce order, Mr.
Colucci was required to pay child support in the amount of
$115 per week per child. Due to a claimed change of
circumstances, in 1998 Mr. Colucci asked to decrease the
support amount, but no agreement was made, and he took
no further action on the issue. For 18 years, beginning in
1998, Mr. Colucci made no voluntary support payments,
had no relationship with his children, and concealed his
whereabouts from both his ex-wife and the Family
Responsibility Office. By the time the children ceased
being eligible for support in 2012, their father owed
approximately $170,000 in arrears.
67

Mr. Colucci first brought a claim to reduce or
rescind (i.e., cancel) his arrears in 2016, four years after the
end of his obligations. The claim was originally dismissed
67

See Colucci, supra note 7 at para 11. The facts of the case are set out
at paras 10–16.
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based on a lack of jurisdiction, as his daughters were no
longer children of the marriage.68 That reasoning was
reversed on appeal in 2017.69 On the merits of the
subsequent claim—the one that eventually formed the
basis for the Court’s reasoning—the trial judge found that
the coming into force of the Child Support Guidelines in
1997 constituted a change of circumstances entitling Mr.
Colucci to a retroactive decrease.70 The trial judge relied
on Mr. Colucci’s actual and imputed income to reduce the
arrears owing by more than $100,000.71
The Court of Appeal allowed Ms. Colucci’s
appeal, reasoning that the trial judge had erred in failing
to apply the DBS factors, which, pursuant to the same
court’s earlier decision in Gray v Rizzi,73 apply to claims
for retroactive increases as well as decreases. Applying the
factors themselves, the Court of Appeal found that Mr.
Colucci was responsible for all of his arrears. That result
was based predominately on the three-year rule from
DBS—that is, the statement, in DBS, that historical child
support should not date back more than three years prior to
72

68

Based upon the statement in DBS, recently nuanced in Michel, that
beneficiaries of child support must still be dependent at the time of a
claim for historical support.

69

Colucci Appeal 1, supra note 39.

70

A “change in circumstances” is the threshold requirement to trigger a
variation of support under s 17(4) of the Divorce Act, supra note 6.

71

See Colucci v Colucci, 2019 ONCA 561 at paras 9–12 [Colucci Appeal
2].

72

Ibid.

73

Supra note 41.
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the claim—74 as Mr. Colucci only brought his motion to
vary four years after his support obligations ended.75
Further, due to his failure to fully and accurately disclose
his finances, the Court could not find hardship in ordering
Mr. Colucci to pay.76 Mr. Colucci’s blameworthy conduct
also worked against him: he had left the country several
times without informing the Family Responsibility Office,
failed to make payments from both within and outside of
the country, and failed to provide evidence of his inability
to pay.77 Finally, his failure to pay caused significant
hardship for his children78 and he did not explain why he
waited so long to attempt to vary the support order.79
The Court heard Mr. Colucci’s appeal in November
2020. The case was an opportunity for the Court to
explicitly address the framework applicable in cases
involving claims for retroactive decreases of support based
on earlier income levels—that is, income at the time
support was due—and to modify the considerations set out
in DBS to better reflect social realities.80

74

See DBS, supra note 1 at para 120–123.

75

See Colucci Appeal 2, supra note 71 at paras 27 and 33–35.

76

Ibid at para 28.

77

Ibid at paras 28–32.

78

Ibid at para 30.

79

Ibid at para 31.

80

It is worth noting that Colucci also enabled the Court to articulate a
framework for the recission, or cancelation, of arrears based on current
inability to pay, a straightforward analysis that does not significantly
alter the law of historical child support, and therefore will not be
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2.2 ENDORSING A GENDERED APPROACH TO
CHILD SUPPORT
As mentioned above, Justice Martin’s concurring reasons
in Michel represent an understanding of child support
grounded in the pursuit of gender equality. In Colucci, that
move crystallized, with Justice Martin reiterating many of
the same points, this time on behalf of a unanimous Court.
Moreover, the Colucci Court goes even further, directly
articulating concerns around the relationship between
unpaid child support and the feminization of poverty, and
indirectly recognising that the proper enforcement of child
support, including historical support, functions as a
mechanism for achieving substantive equality for both
women and children.81 Thus, Colucci represents a long
overdue acknowledgement, on the part of the Court, of the
realities of the feminization of poverty in the context of
child support,82 and the connection between women’s
economic situations and those of their children.83 Indeed,
addressed in this comment. See Colucci, supra note 7 at paras 133–
141.
81

While the Court is not explicit about this recognition, Justice Martin
cites scholarship articulating the connections between child support
enforcement and substantive gender equality. See Colucci, supra note
7 at paras 69 and 112, citing Donna Martinson and Margaret Jackson,
“Family Violence and Evolving Judicial Roles: Judges as Equality
Guardians in Family Law Cases” (2017) 30:1 Can J Fam L 11; Bakht
et al, supra note 15.

82

As discussed earlier, these realities were first recognised by the Court
in the context of spousal support in Moge, supra note 14.

83

As discussed earlier, compared to fathers with sole custody, women
with sole custody or parenting time are almost twice as likely to live
below the poverty line. Further, young children are more likely to live
in poverty due to their mothers’ earnings being lower for several years
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Colucci draws heavily on the submissions of two
interveners, LEAF and Canada Without Poverty, thereby
incorporating perspectives that were noticeably absent
from DBS. In recognising these elements and considering
the importance of socio-legal realities, the Court focused
on three key areas: the fact that child support is the right of
the child, the decreasing importance of certainty for payors,
and, most significantly, the necessity of full, consistent
disclosure by payor parents. Importantly, also absent in
DBS and worth acknowledging here, was Justice Martin,
whose professional background would have predisposed
her to a consideration of the gendered impacts of family
law.84

following childbirth. See Children in Low-Income Households, supra
note 10.
84

Prior to her initial appointment to the judiciary, Justice Martin acted on
behalf of the Women’s Legal Education Action Fund. As a professor
and scholar, she devoted much of her work to the situation of women
in the legal system and as victims and survivors of sexual assault. See
Office of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs Canada, “The
Honourable Sheilah Martin’s Questionnaire” (last modified 21
December 2017), online: Government of Canada <www.fja.gc.ca/scccsc/2017-SheilahMartin/nominee-candidat-eng.html>. As a doctoral
candidate at the University of Toronto, Justice Martin studied “legal
controls” on reproduction and subsequently published several articles
on the legal dimensions of abortion in Canada and women’s right to
control their bodies. See e.g. Sheilah L Martin, "Canada's Abortion
Law and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1986) 1:2
Can J Women & L 339; Sheilah L Martin, "The New Abortion
Legislation" (1990) 1:2 Const F 5; Sheilah Martin & Murray Coleman,
"Judicial Intervention in Pregnancy" (1995) 40:4 McGill LJ 947.
Further evidence of Justice Martin’s demonstrated commitment to
gender equality can be found in her questionnaire responses when
applying to sit on the Supreme Court of Canada as referenced above.
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2.2.1 Child Support as the Child’s Right
The idea of child support as the right of the child is by no
means new to Canadian law; it was articulated as early as
1970, in one of the first appellate court interpretations of
the child support provisions of the Divorce Act.85 However,
this right has often been tempered by a focus on the rights
of payors, as seen in the emphasis on payor certainty in
DBS.86 Colucci suggests that the right of the child to
receive support will no longer be diluted, or subordinate, to
the rights of parents. 87 As mentioned, the Child Support
Guidelines have long made clear that their principal
objective is protecting a child’s right to a “fair standard of
support.”88 By rejecting rules or principles that create
incentives for payors to ignore their obligations,89 Colucci
confirms that legal standards and interpretations should be
based, above all, on promoting the wellbeing of children.
Indeed, a child’s right to support is the “core interest to
which all rules and principles must yield.”90 This focus
represents a significant shift that makes clear, in no
uncertain terms, that children are the focal point of child
support discussions and that following Colucci, children’s
interest in a fair amount of support will no longer yield to
the interests of payor parents.

85

See Paras, supra note 20.

86

See DBS, supra note 1.

87

See Colucci, supra note 7.

88

Child Support Guidelines, supra note 6, s 1.

89

See Colucci, supra note 7 at para 4.

90

Ibid at para 46.
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2.2.2 The Decreasing Importance of Payor Certainty
Moving to the Court’s discussion of certainty, Colucci
ensures that the DBS-era primacy of payor certainty is now
a thing of the past. While certainty for payors is not
irrelevant,91 the creation of the Child Support Guidelines
represented a “paradigm shift” that makes clear that
payors’ obligations always relate to their income.92 Thus,
absent exceptional circumstances,93 the Child Support
Guidelines create the necessary certainty that preoccupied
the DBS Court. Indeed, Justice Martin acknowledges that
DBS was a compromise of sorts between the pre- and postChild Support Guidelines eras but also that, in the
intervening years, “expectations of and for payors have
evolved.”94 Based on that evolution, the Court finds that
certainty is most important as it relates to children’s (and,
implicitly, custodial parents’) certainty in receiving
support,95 thus shifting the focus to the rights of children
rather than those of payors. In practical terms, certainty for
children and custodial parents that they will receive the
support owed to them prevails over certainty for payors,

91

See Colucci, supra note 7 where Justice Martin outlines the three
interests to balance in historical support case (citing DBS, supra note 1
at paras 2, 74, and 96), the second being “… the interest of the parties
and the child in certainty and predictability” at para 42.

92

Colucci, supra note 7 at para 34.

93

See ibid at para 77. This of course can be more complex in situations
of shared or split parenting or regarding extraordinary expenses.

94

Ibid at para 44.

95

See ibid at para 46.

238

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 34, 2022]

which, in any case, is built into the Child Support
Guidelines.
2.2.3 The Necessity of Disclosure
The most significant shift in the Court’s understanding of
child support law is arguably its revised outlook on the
issue of disclosure. As mentioned above, DBS garnered
significant criticism for its view that disclosure was
important but too burdensome to make mandatory.96 In the
years since DBS—perhaps upon seeing how many
historical child support cases hinge on the issue of nondisclosure—the Court has changed its position. The shift
began in Michel, with Justice Brown quoting the oftrepeated reference to non-disclosure as the “cancer of
family law litigation.”97 And it is even more pronounced in
Colucci, where the Court is unequivocal that disclosure is
required for “a just and effective family law system.”98
Indeed, following Colucci, disclosure is now the
indisputable “linchpin” of family law.99
This new focus on the importance of disclosure
aims to address the issue of informational asymmetry
between parties; without a way to require disclosure,
recipient parents, typically mothers, are left with the entire
burden of searching for and requesting income information
from payors. In Colucci, Justice Martin explains how this
96

See e.g. Bakht et al, supra note 15 at 563.

97

Michel, supra note 1 at para 33, citing Cunha v Cunha, 99 BCLR (2d)
93 at para 9, 1994 CanLII 3195.

98

Colucci, supra note 7 at para 4.

99

See ibid at paras 4, 32, and 48.
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creates an unfair requirement to enforce child support
obligations, on top of all the other responsibilities borne by
primary parents.100 The Court’s solution is to create the
“need for full and frank disclosure of the payor’s
income.”101 Again, this is not a novel move; prior to
Colucci, disclosure was regularly required by courts and
legislatures.102 Colucci thus functions to endorse regular
practice by encouraging trial judges to include mandatory
disclosure requirements in their orders, so as to minimize
the need for historical support applications.103
Disclosure requirements may also impact the
negotiation of private agreements. In Colucci, the Court
recognises that disclosure is a requirement for good faith
negotiation as it helps to ensure that parties can make fully
informed decisions.104 Thus, full disclosure promotes the
objective, set out in the Child Support Guidelines, of
reducing conflict and encouraging settlement.105
Settlement and private ordering are, of course, of utmost
importance in family law, given its prospective nature and
the damage that adversarial litigation, with its inherent
unpredictability, can wreak on families.106 Much like how
the Child Support Guidelines enable parties to bargain in

100

See ibid at para 49.

101

Ibid at para 47.

102

See ibid at paras 52 and 53.

103

See ibid at para 112.

104

See ibid at para 51.

105

Child Support Guidelines, supra note 6, s 1.

106

See ibid.
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light of the law,107 mandatory disclosure enables them to
negotiate with the full picture in mind.
Importantly, mandatory disclosure is especially
significant in situations of family violence. The Colucci
Court recognises that in situations of violence, reaching out
for negotiation is not appropriate.108 Thus, court-mandated
disclosure addresses the reality that child support
applications and discussions can be used by abusers as a
tool to maintain control over survivors and those
vulnerable to further abuse.109 Moreover, while not
explicitly addressed in Colucci, the reference to family
violence comes on the heels of amendments to the Divorce
Act that draw an explicit connection between family
violence and the best interests of the child.110 By
acknowledging all of these issues and so clearly outlining
the necessity of disclosure, the Court has gone a long way
toward feminizing child support law and ensuring it
coheres with the lived experiences of women and children.

107

See Robert H Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, “Bargaining in the
Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce” (1979) 88:5 Yale LJ 950;
Craig Martin, “Unequal Shadows: Negotiation Theory and Spousal
Support Under Canadian Divorce Law” (1998) 56:1 UT Fac L Rev
135. On the connections between limiting discretion in the family law
context and the fate of women litigants see Jodi Lazare “The Spousal
Support Advisory Guidelines, Soft Law, and the Procedural Rule of
Law” (2019) 31:2 CJWL 317.

108

See Colucci, supra note 7 at para 69.
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See LEAF Colucci Factum, supra note 13 at para 7.
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See Divorce Act, supra note 6, ss 16(3)(j) and 16(4).
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2.3 GENDERED CHILD SUPPORT IN PRACTICE
With the endorsement of a gendered approach to child
support, it is only natural that the Court would restructure
the format of the historical support framework to ensure
that its theoretical foundations are concretized in practice.
Colucci thus modifies three key aspects of historical child
support law: (1) it creates a presumption of an award for
historical support; (2) it softens the three-year rule relating
to the period of so-called retroactivity; and (3) it makes the
DBS factors relevant to determining the time-period of
“retroactivity” instead of eligibility for an award.
Moreover, the Court re-examines the DBS factors
themselves and details precisely how they fit within the
revised framework. It is important to note here that
although Colucci deals specifically with a claim for a
retroactive decrease in support (or cancelation of arrears
owing), the Court is express that for the sake of
consistency, its approach would also apply to claims for
retroactive increases.111 Colucci thus creates an
overarching approach to historical child support anchored
in a theoretical framework aimed at promoting substantive
gender equality.
2.3.1 Presumed Historical Support Awards
In terms of the framework for adjudicating claims for
historical child support, Colucci’s most substantial impact
will likely result from the creation of a new presumption in
favour of awarding the change requested (whether that is
an increase or decrease), provided there has been a change
of circumstances. Justice Martin did not equivocate when
111

See Colucci, supra note 7 at para 6.
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she wrote: “[I]t is no longer necessary to first ask whether
retroactive relief is generally appropriate before moving to
the question of how far back [it] should extend.”112 In
practical terms, this means that once a change in income
has been shown, the only question to be answered is how
far back the varied support order should go.113 This is a
clear shift from the DBS framework, according to which,
the determination of whether to order a historical award
was discretionary, and based on a number of factors. Given
the critiques of DBS discussed above, this change
represents a clear endorsement of the gendered approach to
historical support. By creating a presumption in favour of
an award, the Court has addressed some of the problems
that typically result from the broad exercise of judicial
discretion by structuring it in a way that safeguards the best
interests of children,114 as well as recipient parents. Indeed,
eliminating discretion as to the appropriateness of an award
should help mitigate the unpredictability and lack of
transparency that typically plague exercises of broad
judicial discretion, and the negative ways those issues
impact self-represented litigants and hinder settlement.115
The drawbacks of judicial discretion in family law
are well-known.116 One of the principal rationales
112

Ibid.

113

See ibid at para 73.

114

See ibid at para 55.

115

See ibid at paras 68–69. For scholarship examining these ideas, see e.g.
Thompson, “Rules and Rulelessness”, supra note 26; Bala, supra note
21; Lazare, supra note 107.

116

See Bala, supra note 21; Thompson, “Rules and Rulelessness”, supra
note 26.
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underlying the creation of the Child Support Guidelines
was the reduction of discretion in determining child
support awards.117 Thus, Colucci functions to bring the law
of historical child support in line with the broader purposes
of child support law, and family law more generally, while
addressing issues of substantive equality, promoting the
rights of the child, and ensuring that parents are treated
fairly while being held to their obligations.
2.3.2 Erosion of the Three-Year Rule
Drawing on her concurring comments in Michel, Justice
Martin, in Colucci, subtly modified the language used to
refer to the three-year limit for ordering changes to
historical support.118 In DBS, the three-year limit was
introduced as the time period that would be appropriate for
most historical awards; although it was referred to as a
“rough guideline,” the Court made it clear that, subject to
a payor’s blameworthy conduct, it would usually be
inappropriate to award support further back than that.119
This move was not without contention; in her concurring
reasons,120 Justice Abella argued that the three-year rule
would unnecessarily fetter judicial discretion and that such
117

Child Support Guidelines, supra note 6, s 1(b) and (d).

118

As explained above, this refers to three-years prior to the date of
effective notice of a claim for historical support. See DBS, supra note
1 at paras 120–123.

119

Ibid at para 123.

120

While Justice Abella agreed with the majority in the results of all four
appeals, she took issue with much of the majority’s analysis, and
especially with the three-year rule and the majority’s preoccupation
with the conduct of recipient parents. See ibid at paras 162–164, 169,
and 172–175.
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a limitation on a child’s entitlement required express
statutory language.121 As a compromise of sorts between
those positions, Justice Martin, in Colucci, referred to the
three-year rule as a “presumption only,”122 rebuttable based
on the impact of the DBS factors, which now go toward
determining the length of the award. Although this is not
an entirely new change (Justice Martin brought a similar
nuance in Michel), the reasoning in Colucci carries the
added weight of a unanimous Court.
Further to that nuance, Justice Martin also
suggested—as she did in Michel—that in the future, it may
be desirable for the Court to revisit the three-year rule
entirely and make the presumptive start date that of the
income increase,123 thus echoing Justice Abella’s view in
DBS. Although technically obiter, that comment
nevertheless suggests a willingness on the part of the Court
to go even further, given the right set of facts, to promote
children’s right to support. It also corresponds with the
Court’s overall focus on disclosure and equality, as such a
change would likely address the many issues related to
non-disclosure and informational asymmetry,124 and would
thus further promote the pursuit of substantive equality for
women and children.125
121

See ibid at para 175.
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Colucci, supra note 7 at para 39.
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See ibid at para 45.

124

See ibid at para 47.
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It should also be pointed out here that trial courts have already begun
addressing these comments by Justice Martin in Michel, but they have
not yet needed to be applied. This is because Michel also expanded the
concept of blameworthy conduct to include non-disclosure, and
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2.3.3 Repositioning the DBS Factors
As a result of the Colucci presumption in favour of an
award, the DBS factors now have a new role to play in the
historical child support framework. Where prior to
Colucci, the factors addressed the question of whether a
support order was appropriate, they are now only relevant
to one question: “[S]hould the court depart from the
presumptive date of retroactivity to achieve a fair
result?”126 With this move, judicial discretion is now only
relevant at this second stage,127 thus eliminating the
“layering of discretion” created in DBS,128 ensuring greater
predictability for parties, and encouraging settlement.129
Also, as the three-year presumption is calculated from the
date of notice, this change to the role of the factors brings
their use more in line with the reality of their impact. Since
the factors include things that impact upon notice, such as
the reason for delaying notice as well as issues around
payor conduct, it is indeed more sensible for them to be
used to determine how far back from the date of notice an
award should go.

blameworthy conduct was stated in DBS to overcome the three-year
rule anyway. As non-disclosure is an issue in most historical child
support cases, there is potential for the three-year rule to generally
become irrelevant without the Court needing to rule on it. See e.g.
Zevallos v Munoz, 2021 ONCJ 94 and RJ v TJ, 2021 ONCJ 137.
126

Colucci, supra note 7 at para 71.

127

See ibid at para 96.
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See ibid at paras 69–71.
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Thus, the Court took Colucci as an opportunity to
clarify and expand on the DBS factors. That clarification
included adapting the factors to apply to claims, by payors,
for retroactive decreases, and expanding on the factors
themselves to adequately balance all interests at play.130 It
is important to note that several of these adjustments were
previously contemplated by Justice Martin in her
concurring reasons in Michel and thus have already seen
some use by lower courts.131
The first of those adjustments relates to the reason
for delay on the part of the recipient parent in bringing the
application (i.e., why is this a question of historical support
rather than having been brought immediately upon the
change to income?). Whereas in DBS the question was
framed as whether there was a “reasonable excuse” for the
delay,132 Colucci instead instructs judges to ask only
whether there was an “understandable reason” for the
delay.133 Justice Martin thus distanced her judgement from
the positive duty other courts imposed on recipient parents
to request disclosure and take appropriate action. In doing
so, the Court took a more nuanced and sensitive approach,
accounting for the various social factors, first outlined by
Justice Martin in Michel, that might impact the decision to
seek child support.134 These social factors include the costs
and length of litigation, lack of emotional and material
130

See ibid at para 96.

131
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132
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133
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134

Michel, supra note 1 at paras 111–113.
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resources, misinformation about the payor’s income, and
fear of violence or reprisal by payors and of ruining a
parent-child relationship.135 By outlining clear reasons that
often explain women’s hesitations to bring child support
applications, the Court accepts the difficulty inherent in
these types of legal battles and acknowledges the ways in
which this process further burdens women who already
bear a disproportionate weight of childcare duties.
Related to the recipient’s reason for delay is the
second factor: the conduct of the payor parent. In Colucci,
the Court appeared to have renamed this factor, removing
the “blameworthy” qualifier to recognise that payors’
“efforts to disclose and communicate” will likely favour
payors in the context of a claim for a retroactive decrease
in support.136
Further, the definition of blameworthy conduct was
expanded to make clear that it includes any action that has
the effect of placing the payor’s interest above that of their
child or children.137 Moreover, the Court confirmed that the
payor’s subjective intention will rarely be relevant in
evaluating their conduct.138 Prior to Colucci, courts were
135
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136
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137
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138
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relevant” and not “never.” As the Court offers no suggestions, it is hard
to conceptualise of circumstances in which intention would be relevant
when the effect of the payor’s actions is, or was, to disadvantage the
beneficiary child.
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inconsistent in whether they adopted such an expansive
definition of blameworthy conduct.139 Going forward,
there should be no uncertainty around the fact that selfish
conduct, which puts their own economic interests above
those of their children, will result in consequences for
payors, in the form of a larger award, spanning a longer
time period.
No meaningful change was brought to the
consideration of the circumstances of the child, but the
Court did make clear that in dealing with claims for a
retroactive decrease, the fact that a child is currently living
in poverty will work to lessen the period of retroactivity.140
The importance of this factor illustrates that above all else,
the goal of the Child Support Guidelines—and of child
support generally—is to ensure that children are properly
supported, while also recognising the startling reality of
child poverty in Canada.141
The last factor in the DBS framework relates to
what hardship will be endured based on the award. In DBS,
this factor addressed only hardship to the payor.142
Following Colucci, hardship on the part of the recipient
parent and child must also be considered.143 This includes
both potential hardship from reduced support in the case of
a claim for a decrease, as well as the fact that in the absence
139
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140
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of proper support, recipient parents are often left to
shoulder disproportionate burdens, or children are required
to go without.144
By revisiting and revising the DBS factors,
modifying their function, and creating a presumption in
favour of a historical support award, Colucci has simplified
the law of historical child support in the interests of
efficiency and gender equality. Moreover, as seen, the
Colucci approach better responds to the connections
between mothering, parenting, child support, and women
and children’s poverty, thus reflecting the lived reality of
many Canadian women. After decades of being
underserved by the courts, facing issues of under- or nonpayment, and being forced to bear the emotional and
financial burden of parenting alone, it is possible that
mothers may now find relief in the Court recognizing and
addressing their struggles, and finally setting out an
understanding of child support law that embodies and aims
to promote substantive gender equality.145
CONCLUSION
The Court’s decision in Colucci has undoubtedly changed
the face of historical child support law in Canada. By
removing documented barriers and clearly recognising the
societal factors at play, the Court adopted a feminist lens
144
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and implemented a gendered approach that could go a long
way, not only toward simplifying a complex area of law,
but to increasing access to justice and substantive equality
for recipients of child support, who remain
overwhelmingly women. Colucci presented an opportunity
for the Court to address many of the problems that resulted
from DBS and the Court appears to have seized the day,
creating a presumption in favour of historical support,
modifying the role of the DBS factors, and moving away
from judicial discretion and its associated pitfalls. Indeed,
the creation of a presumption in favour of an award means
there is room for optimism that Colucci might work to
decrease the number of these cases that go to trial.
However, despite this clear step forward, Colucci
nevertheless raises questions about how helpful the
decision will be at a more general level.
One of those questions relates to the Court’s
continued reliance on the DBS factors as part of the
historical child support analysis. While the factors have
indeed been clarified and their function adjusted, they still
represent the same general ideas from DBS, which, as
discussed, were rife with issues related to the Court’s
preoccupation with payor certainty. Concerns relating to
judicial discretion may now be less prevalent due to the
DBS factors relating to timing of retroactivity rather than
entitlement. But only time will tell if the same issues of
inconsistency, inadequacy, and unpredictability that tend to
come along with discretion will simply be repositioned as
well.146 Further, although the three-year rule has been
146

As discussed by Bakht et al, supra note 15 at 561, the disadvantages
faced by women due to discretionary rules has been an issue since
before the Child Support Guidelines. The same unpredictability and
inconsistency were also observable following DBS (See Section 2.2.1.,

COMMENT ON COLUCCI V COLUCCI

251

softened—and, to some extent, seems to be disappearing—
it still acts as an artificial barrier lacking any statutory
justification.147 There is accordingly room for caution in
imagining the impact Colucci may have.
While the Court’s consideration of issues of gender
inequality and the feminization of poverty may inspire
optimism, it is not yet time to celebrate. The Court dealt
expressly with these issues in 1992,148 and yet, lower courts
did not consistently apply Justice L’Heureux-Dubé’s
reasoning about women’s poverty where spousal support is
concerned,149 nor did the Court take up the same logic in
DBS. It remains to be seen whether Justice Martin’s
gendered approach to historical child support will take
hold.
It is also crucial to note the potential importance of
these changes in the current context of the COVID-19
pandemic, which has resulted in much higher levels of

above, for more information on this issue), as courts reasoned
differently in different jurisdictions on the issues of eligibility and
historic decreases.
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unemployment among women and mothers than men.150
That difference has been attributed to both women’s
overrepresentation in sectors affected most by the
pandemic (i.e., the service sector and small firms) as well
as their increased family responsibilities, especially where
there are school-aged children at home.151 This increased
economic gender disparity during a time of crisis serves to
highlight the necessity of these types of substantive
equality-based approaches within the legal system.
Decisions like Colucci should help to mitigate, if not
lessen, such disparities.
Finally, it is fundamental to note that despite our
view that the Colucci framework represents a step forward
in the law of child support, the decision is nevertheless a
band-aid for the most pressing issue plaguing the law of
intimate relationships: the ongoing privatisation of
dependency and support. Colucci takes important steps
toward holding individual parents accountable for
supporting their children. But while this kind of parental
accountability is necessary, decisions like Colucci can
easily work to avoid addressing the connection between
systemic poverty and the state’s refusal to take

150
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responsibility for children’s wellbeing.152 The Court’s
embrace of a gendered theory of child support is a
significant accomplishment in the pursuit of substantive
gender equality. But it does not explain why we still have
not found a way to prevent children from being victims of
their parents’ failure to adequately support them.153 Until
we do, however, Colucci, and decisions like it, might help
to level the playing field in the context of the economic
consequences of family breakdown and childcare.
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